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and learning processes that enable individuals to learn to self-regulate their intergroup biases, and in the outcomes of such regulatory efforts (for reviews, see Monteith, Arthur, & McQueary, in press; Monteith & Mark, 2009 ).
Laboratory research examining the selfregulation of prejudice has used a variety of experimental paradigms with college student samples that have been critical for theory building and testing. However, university settings provide a strong press toward egalitarianism, explicitly endorse diversity, and undoubtedly can exert powerful effects on the likelihood, extent, and processes involved in the selfregulation of prejudice (Henry, 2008) . Furthermore, experimental situations conducive to the selfregulation of prejudice are created so that aspects of self-regulation can be studied. This begs the question-do people regulate in the same ways in "real life"? In the present research we sought an understanding of the phenomenology of self-regulation gained from first-person descriptions of experiences that occurred in non-laboratory contexts. In other words, we sought to understand the lived character of the self-regulation of prejudice.
Extant theory on the self-regulation of prejudice
The Self-Regulation of Prejudice (SRP) model (e.g., Monteith, 1993; Monteith, Ashburn-Nardo, Voils, & Czopp, 2002) explains how the process of regulating one's prejudiced responses may be accomplished, particularly among people who hold low-prejudice attitudes. According to the model (see Figure 1) , the self-regulatory process is initiated when the activation of stereotypic or evaluative associations results in a biased response (e.g., the stereotype of Blacks as criminals results in one clutching one's purse when passing a Black person). Such a response may be discrepant with standards for how one should respond. Awareness of the discrepant response should then result in various outcomes that have regulatory implications. First, arousal should be momentarily increased and accompanied by a brief interruption of ongoing responding, or behavioral inhibition. Second, discrepancyassociated affect should be experienced in the form of negative feelings directed toward the self (e.g., disappointment with the self and guilt). Third, retrospective reflection should occur, whereby attentional resources are directed toward indicators of the discrepant response, such as where one was when it occurred and other features of the context. These discrepancy-associated consequences result in an association being built between the discrepant response, the negative consequences of it (i.e., negative affect), and related contextual stimuli. This results in the establishment of cues for control. That is, people, places, things in the environment, or even states of mind (e.g., feeling angry) become associated with the discrepant response and the aversive outcomes of it.
According to the SRP model, establishing cues for control is essential to the subsequent regulation of prejudiced responses. They serve as critical inputs to the monitoring system that continually checks ongoing activity so that desired outcomes may occur despite unwanted inclinations (e.g., Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Gray, 1987) . The presence of cues for control in future situations where a discrepant response could occur should briefly interrupt ongoing responding (i.e., behavior inhibition occurs again) and aid in the recruitment of regulatory resources. This prospective reflection results in more carefully executed and less prejudiced responses. Researchers have suggested that the process of regulation theoretically can become routinized and initiated preconsciously, so preemptive control and potentially even de-automatization of one's biases may occur (e.g., Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2008; Monteith et al., 2002 ; see also Stanley, Phelps, & Banaji, 2008) .
Empirical research on the self-regulation of prejudice
Research on the self-regulation of prejudice has used both correlational and experimental approaches that, while valuable, nonetheless have limitations. Research that has used the correlational approach reveals that the more participants report in various scenarios (i.e., on the ShouldWould Discrepancy Questionnaire; Monteith & Voils, 1998 ) that they actually would respond with greater prejudice than they believe they should, the greater their feelings of discomfort and (for low-prejudice people in particular) negative selfdirected affect (e.g., guilt) (e.g., Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Monteith & Voils, 1998; Monteith, Devine, & Zuwerink, 1993) . Although informative, this approach to assessing awareness of, and affective consequences to, discrepancies has limitations. People may recognize prejudicerelated discrepancies when hypothetical scenarios are provided for thoughtful consideration in a laboratory setting, but discrepant responses may go unnoticed in people's lived experiences. Even if potentially biased responses are detected, the tendency to rationalize or justify them that is some times observed in laboratory settings (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Monteith, Voils, & Ashburn-Nardo, 2001 ) may be even more likely in real world settings that often offer handy ways of explaining away or ignoring one's biases (see Henry, 2008) . In addition, the Should-Would Discrepancy questionnaire employed in past correlational research (Monteith & Voils, 1998) uses items that tap quite subtly prejudiced responses that may be sufficient to elicit guilt only for people who are personally committed to being nonprejudiced. If higher-prejudice individuals experience discrepant responses that involve more blatant or extreme instances of biases, even they may report discrepancy-associated guilt. In the present research, our phenomenological approach will be helpful for understanding (1) whether people detect prejudice-related discrepancies in their lived experiences and report affective consequences, and also (2) what types of discrepant responses occur in people's everyday lives.
Another approach to examining affective reactions to prejudice-related discrepancies and other discrepancy-associated outcomes has involved the experimental manipulation of discrepancies. For example, White participants led to believe they were having prejudiced physiological reactions to pictures of Blacks subsequently showed regulatory reactions that were consistent with the SRP model (Amodio, Devine, & Harmon-Jones, 2007; Monteith et al., 2002) . Such experimental methods, although appropriate for establishing causality under conditions that are ripe for regulation, beg the question of whether people actually experience prejudice-related discrepancies and their consequences in the considerably more complex, cognitively taxing, and psychologically knotty terrain of everyday social life. 
Goals of the present research
One of our main objectives was to determine whether people are aware of prejudice-related discrepancies in their everyday lives, and whether these experiences give rise to affective reactions and regulatory consequences that ultimately facilitate greater control over prejudiced responses. This objective is critical to testing the relevance of the SRP model and related findings to people's lived experiences. Finding that people can recognize and reflect on the self-regulation of prejudice in their daily lives would be an important contribution to our current understanding of the usefulness of this prejudice reduction strategy.
Using an interview methodology, non-Black participants described experiences in which they felt, thought, or did something in relation to Blacks and later wished they had responded differently. Thus, we could examine how common discrepancy experiences were, and also the nature and content of their discrepancy experiences. Participants were also encouraged to discuss whether their experiences gave rise to certain feelings, and to talk about whether they were reminded of their experiences at some later time and subsequently made any changes. This portion of the interview allowed us to assess the regulatory impact of initial discrepancy experiences.
Another main objective of the present research was to examine the relation between certain individual difference variables and self-regulation, partly to examine novel issues of potential theoretical interest, and partly to help validate the interview methodology. For instance, we expected participants who reported greater discrepancies on the Should-Would Discrepancy Questionnaire (Monteith & Voils, 1998) would likewise report more discrepancy experiences during the interview. In addition, participants who scored high on a measure of Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) activity, and are thus prone to monitoring their environments for threat, should report more prejudice-related discrepancies.
We also measured motivational bases for controlling prejudice (Plant & Devine, 1998) . Past research testing the SRP model has focused on people who are internally motivated; however, prejudice regulation may also occur for people who are externally motivated to control prejudice (Amodio, Kubota, Harmon-Jones, & Devine, 2006; Plant & Devine, 2009 ). We expected participants who were relatively unmotivated to control prejudice for either internal or external reasons to be unlikely to report discrepancy experiences. Participants with high internal motivation should recount a relatively large number of discrepancy experiences, regardless of whether they were also externally motivated to control their prejudice. Of particular interest was whether people who are externally, but not internally, motivated to control prejudice would report discrepancies. If so, these people might also self-regulate their future prejudiced responses even though they lack the internal motivation to control prejudice. Such a finding would extend the SRP model's applicability.
Method Participants
Participants were 153 non-Black (150 White, 1 Asian, 1 Middle Eastern, 1 Puerto Rican) undergraduate students. Ninety-seven of the participants were female. Participants were recruited from a variety of classes so that they varied in their academic classification (47 freshmen, 36 sophomores, 40 juniors, 29 seniors, 1 missing) and majors (37 different majors). Participants recruited from introduction to psychology classes received course credit and others received $15 for their participation.
Procedure
The study involved a structured interview and completion of a questionnaire packet. Participants completed the study individually. A White experimenter explained to participants that there were no right or wrong answers in the study, that participants should respond as openly and honestly as possible, and that all responses were confidential. For the interview portion of the study, the experimenter went on to explain that the purpose of the study was to learn about people's racial experiences. Specifically, participants were told:
We are interested in learning about racial experiences that are related to prejudice and African Americans. I understand that these issues can be a touchy subject, but it's one that all of us deal with. In particular, we're interested in hearing about instances when people have said, thought, or done something that either they themselves or other people thought were prejudiced, biased, or stereotypical. We know from a lot of previous research that just about everyone at one point or another has had certain thoughts or feelings about racial issues that could be considered negative. Such responses are perfectly natural in our society. Still, sometimes when we have such thoughts or feelings, afterwards we wish we could have done things differently. For example, sometimes when people have certain stereotypic thoughts, we want to change them because of what we feel inside. Other times, we may feel there is nothing wrong with our negative reactions, but we wish we had done things differently because other people frown on what we did.
Participants were then asked to try to recall racial experiences in which they thought, felt, or acted in a way toward African Americans that they later wished they had not. They were given a few examples and then had five minutes alone for thinking about any relevant experiences.
A tape recorder was started for the interview, and the experimenter asked the participant to describe his/her first experience. Throughout the interview, the experimenter asked follow-up questions if participants' descriptions did not touch on certain points. Specifically, participants were asked: 1) what in particular was it about the experience that they wished they could have changed or done differently; 2) how they felt; 3) whether they had thought about the experience since it happened; 4) if anything tended to remind them of their experience; and 5) whether the experience changed their behavior in subsequent situations. We sought to have participants describe their prejudice-related discrepancies in their own words and as they experienced them. Thus, these questions were asked rather casually and at points where they fitted in naturally.
For the questionnaire portion of the study, participants completed demographic items, followed by Carver and White's (1994) seven-item Behavioral Inhibition Scale (BIS). These items assess the extent to which participants characteristically monitor situations for potential threats or punishment and are sensitive to such situations (e.g., "I worry about making mistakes"). Responses ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Internal and external motivations to control prejudice were assessed with the Internal Motivation Scale (IMS) and External Motivation Scale (EMS), respectively (Plant & Devine, 1998) . Ratings were made on scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly agree). The five-item IMS includes items such as, "I attempt to act in nonprejudiced ways toward Black people because it is personally important to me."
1 In contrast, the five-item EMS (e.g., "I try to act nonprejudiced toward Black people because of pressure from others") taps into a distinct motivational basis for controlling prejudice that is based on external concerns.
Finally, participants completed the 32-item Should-Would Discrepancy Questionnaire (Monteith & Voils, 1998) , which measures the extent to which people report responding to Blacks more negatively than they believe is appropriate. Specifically, for the 16-item "Should" portion of the scale, participants reported their personal standards for responding to Blacks in various situations (e.g., "I believe that I should not think of Blacks in stereotypical ways"). For the 16-item "Would" portion of the scale, participants indicated how they typically would respond in the situations (e.g., "I sometimes have stereotypical racial thoughts").
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Results
Formation of individual difference indexes
Several individual difference indexes were formed based on the questionnaire portion of the study. Prejudice-related discrepancy scores (Totd) were calculated first by creating 16 difference scores by subtracting each "Should" rating from the corresponding "Would" rating, after reverse scoring where necessary so that higher ratings were always more prejudiced. Then the difference scores were summed to form the Totd index, so that higher Totd scores indicate a greater proneness to responding to discrepancies (a = .59, M = 16.0, SD = 10.05). Responses to the behavioral inhibition items were averaged to form a BIS index, with higher scores reflecting a stronger sensitivity to situations that are potentially threatening or punishing (a = .77, M = 4.88, SD = 1.44). Indexes reflecting the extent to which participants were internally (IMS; a = .86, M = 7.59, SD = 1.36) and externally (EMS; a = .77, M = 4.82, SD = 1.77) motivated to control their prejudice were formed, with higher scores reflecting greater motivation.
Interview coding for indicators of self-regulation
The interviews yielded a rich set of experiences where participants felt, thought, or acted toward Blacks in ways that they later wished they had not. A judge initially listened to the interviews and recorded variables of interest. A second researcher independently coded 15% of the interviews so that inter-judge reliability could be assessed. The first judge also recorded the specific response that participants described as later wishing they had not had (e.g., felt uncomfortable around Blacks at a party). The judge also tagged a subset of the interviews for later transcription with the goal of representing the richness of the data set in terms of the types of experiences described and various aspects of self-regulation.
The number of experiences participants recounted in which they had felt, thought, or behaved in a way that they later wished they had not was recorded. Each experience was examined to determine the type of response participants reported. An exhaustive approach was used initially in which each unique response was noted and recorded along with the frequency with which it occurred across the sample. These responses were then categorized according to whether they involved a feeling, thought, behavior, or some combination of these. Percent agreement between judges for these codings was 90%.
The judge also recorded what types of affective reactions (if any) participants reported as a consequence of their experiences. These affect data could be captured by five categories: negative selfdirected affect (Negself ) (e.g., "guilty," "regretful," "ashamed"); discomfort (e.g., "bad," "horrible," "bothered"); unaffected (e.g., "not bad"); surprised; and negative affect directed toward others (negother) (e.g., "angry at my friend"). Interjudge agreement was 93%. Each experience was coded for whether the participant mentioned each of these five affective reactions or not, with 1 representing mention of the relevant emotion and 0 representing no mention. A composite Negself variable was formed by averaging Negself scores across all of the experiences that a given participant described. The same was done for the creation of a composite discomfort variable. The other types of affect did not occur with enough frequency for systematic analysis.
Finally, each experience was rated in terms of its regulatory impact, or the extent to which the experience appeared to involve the establishment of cues for control and affected participants' future responding. Ratings were made on a scale ranging from 1 (no regulatory impact) to 5 (very strong regulatory impact). Specifically, we used the following coding scheme: 1 = no future impact suggested; 2 = experience made participants think that they should perhaps be more careful in the future, but no indication of subsequent regulation indicated; 3 = experience encouraged future regulation in a general way (e.g., "Now I try not to jump to conclusions"); 4 = future behavior changed because participants' prior experience specifically reminded them in subsequent situations to inhibit stereotypic or evaluative biases; 5 = detailed description of specific situations in which participants regulated their biases because of strong associations they had formed through their initial experience.
Interjudge reliability was acceptable, r(42) = .78, p < .001. A composite regulatory impact variable was formed by averaging ratings for each of the experiences that participants described.
Initial analyses: Gender, year in college, and order
Gender (0 = male; 1 = female) and year in college (coded 1-4) had little effect. Female participants scored higher on the IMS (r = .19, p < .05) and BIS (r = .28, p < .01), and the number of experiences participants reported decreased with their year in college (r = -.19, p < .05). Neither gender nor year in college moderated any effects discussed below, so these variables are not discussed further. We also found that whether participants completed the individual difference measures prior to or following the interview portion of the study was unrelated to scores on the individual difference variables (ps > .23) or to the study's criterion variables (ps > .38). Order was therefore excluded from further analysis.
Number of experiences
The vast majority of participants reported at least one experience where they had a feeling, thought or behavior in relation to Blacks that they later wished they had not had. Specifically, 92% of participants reported having at least one experience, 69% reported two, 44% reported three, 13% reported four, and 3% reported five. There were 491 experiences reported. Thus, the interview procedure yielded an abundant collection of real life experiences that could be analyzed for their content and potential self-regulatory impact.
Relation with individual difference variables
We exa mined the relation between the individual difference variables (i.e., Totd, BIS, IMS, and EMS) and the number of experiences participants reported. Each individual difference variable was centered in its respective distribution and then a regression analysis was performed to predict number of experiences. Specifically, main effects were entered simultaneously and assessed for significance on Step 1. All two-way interactions were entered on Step 2, three-ways on Step 3, and finally the four-way interaction was assessed on
Step 4. When significant interactions were obtained, the regression equation was trimmed to include only those effects that were significant, and these effects were then probed further. Note that this data analytic approach was used for all regression analyses involving the individual difference variables that we report herein. A marginally significant main effect for Totd was found, t(144) = 1.82, p = .07, b = .16, such that participants who reported being more prone to discrepancies on the Should-Would Discrepancy scale tended to report more discrepancy experiences in the interview. This effect likely was not stronger because our interview procedure was designed to assess the experiences that participants brought up during the interview, rather than their proneness to discrepancies across the specific situations targeted in the Should-Would Discrepancy Scale. Furthermore, the scale assesses discrepancies from "shoulds" that are based on participants' personal standards for responding, whereas our participants could focus on discrepancies from other-imposed pressure.
A significant main effect for BIS also emerged, t(144) = 2.83, p < .01, b = .23, indicating that the greater participants' concern and sensitivity over potentially threatening or punishing situations, the more discrepancy experiences they reported. This finding is consistent with the suggestion that the behavioral inhibition system is involved in people's monitoring and detection of instances in which they respond inappropriately to Blacks (Monteith, 1993) .
Finally, a significant interaction between IMS and EMS scores was obtained, t(138) = 2.42, p < .02, b = .20. As shown in Figure 2 , participants who were highly internally motivated to control prejudice reported a relatively large number of experiences regardless of their level of external motivation, t(149) = .52, p = .60, b = -.04. In contrast, participants who were less internally motivated to control prejudice reported significantly fewer experiences as their EMS scores decreased, t(149) = 2.84, p < .01, b = .35. This pattern indicates that participants who are personally unmotivated to control prejudice reported relatively few instances of responding in ways they later wished they had not, unless they were concerned about controlling their prejudice for external reasons. Presumably participants who are neither internally nor externally motivated to control prejudice have biased responses but do not regret them. Perhaps more important is that the presence of external motivation, even in the absence of low-prejudice personal motivations, was associated with recognizing prejudice-related discrepancy experiences. This suggests that external motivations are sufficient for engaging self-regulatory activity, at least at the initial stage of discrepancy recognition.
Content of experiences described
As shown in Table 1 , participants' discrepancy experiences were most likely to involve behaviors. This is sensible, as biases that are outwardly observable to the self and potentially others seem more likely to be candidates for later regret. However, having discrepant thoughts was also very common, with discrepant feelings being least common. Table 2 further categorizes the behaviors, thoughts, and feelings and provides examples of each.
Behaviors The behaviors fell into four discernable categories, and behaviors that did not clearly fit into one of these categories were coded as miscellaneous. As shown in Table 2 , the most common behaviors involved making offensive statements either to Blacks or about Blacks. The second most common behaviors involved biased actions in relation to Blacks. The third category involved avoidance of Blacks, where participants went out of their way to avoid Blacks or created social distance between themselves and Blacks. The final behavioral theme involved passive reactions to others' prejudice, in which participants wished they had said or done something when someone else told a racial joke or made offensive statements.
Thoughts The majority of discrepant thoughts involved negative stereotyping. As shown in Table  2 , these thoughts were further categorized according to the type of negative stereotype involved. The most frequent were thoughts of Blacks as violent, dangerous, or aggressive. Another category was stereotypic thoughts that Blacks are rude or vulgar. Stereotypic thoughts that Blacks are criminal and lazy were also evident. Participants also sometimes simply reported that they wished they had not thought of Blacks stereotypically but did not specify the content further. Finally, negative stereotyping occurred with respect to taste in music and clothing. Other categories of discrepant thoughts involved making negative judgments, disapproving thoughts about interracial relationships, thoughts about avoiding Blacks, and thinking that Blacks get more than they deserve. Feelings The vast majority of discrepant feelings involved some form of discomfort, such as feeling uncomfortable, nervous, scared, or threatened around Blacks. Other feelings entailed irritation and rejection-based feelings related to interracial couples.
Discrepancy-associated affect
The examination of interview data reported above suggested that participants reported a wide array of experiences where they engaged in behaviors or had thoughts or feelings in relation to Blacks that they later wished they had not had. According to the SRP model, these experiences may lead to the establishment of cues for control and result in future regulation of prejudiced responses. A critical element of this proposed impact of discrepancy experiences is the experience of negative affect in relation to one's prejudiced responses. Thus, we examined the interview data for evidence of affective outcomes of the reported experiences. As shown in Table 3 , Negself feelings were described as part of the experiences in 64% of the cases. For the majority of these cases, participants used words to describe their emotions that directly indicated the experience of negative selfdirected affect, such as feelings of guilt, regret, shame, and disappointment with the self. For example, one participant described his reaction to his assumption that the Black basketball players were unintelligent: And I honestly thought they were lower in their IQ, or whatever, because they just went through school because they could play ball. Then I had one of them in my class and he is extremely smart. And after I found that out I realized some kids are like that and probably are very intelligent. . . . I felt real bad about it and so I try not to look at it like "Well, they only get their grades because of basketball" 'cause they do have to work for them as well. I felt horrible after that 'cause I even made comments to other people "Well, they're given their grades because they play ball." . . . I don't even know them. All of them could be smart for all I know. But I guess it's just because of the things you hear, hearsay, people take notes for them. I just automatically thought they didn't know anything. I felt regretful, ashamed.
In the remaining cases coded as involving Negself, participants described themselves in ways that suggested this type of affective reaction but without the use of emotional labels (e.g., "I felt hypocritical," and "I felt like I wasn't a good person"). Participants were also likely to indicate that their experiences produced various forms of discomfort, such as feeling bothered, uncomfortable, awkward, horrible, and nervous. There were very few instances in which participants reported other types of emotional reactions (see Table 3 ). These findings nicely corroborate past research in which completion of the Should-Would Discrepancy Scale (e.g., Monteith & Voils, 1998) and experimental manipulations of discrepancies (e.g., Monteith, 1993; Monteith et al., 2002) have been found to elicit feelings of Negself and Discomfort. The present research indicates that participants' spontaneous descriptions of their emotional reactions to their real world discrepancy experiences do indeed involve these two dimensions of affect. In fact, fully 89% of the discrepancy experiences described by participants were accompanied by expressions of affective reactions that were coded as involving either Negself or Discomfort.
Relation to individual difference variables
We predicted participants' emotional reactions to their experiences using the individual difference variables (Totd, BIS, IMS, and EMS) and their interactions. Specifically, each experience described as resulting in Negself was given a score of 1 (and 0 if Negself was not evident), and the average of these scores across experiences was used as the dependent variable. The regression analysis revealed no significant effects in the analysis of Negself, nor in a parallel analysis predicting the average of the general discomfort scores. Based on past research, a reasonable finding may have been that the participants who were more internally motivated would report greater Negself in relation to their discrepancy experiences than participants lower in internal motivation (e.g., Devine et al., 1991) . There was a tendency in this direction, but it did not reach significance, t(133) = 1.23, p = .22, b = .11.
However, note that prior experimental research (e.g., Monteith, 1993; Monteith et al., 2002) and correlational studies with the Should-Would Discrepancy scale (e.g., Monteith & Voils, 1998) have focused on affective reactions to quite subtly prejudiced responses. In contrast, the open-ended response style of the present research allowed participants to consider their unique discrepancy experiences, which allowed for greater variation and-importantly-potential extremity. Lower IMS participants were, in fact, less likely to report discrepancy experiences (unless they were also high on EMS, see analyses above of number of experiences), but experiences that they did have apparently were sufficiently inconsistent with principles of fairness and decency to elicit Negself.
This reasoning implies that lower IMS participants' reported experiences should be more extreme in their biased nature than experiences reported by higher IMS participants. To test this reasoning, we revisited the descriptions of responses that participants later regretted, and we coded them for extremity on a 5-point scale ranging from low extremity (e.g., simply noticing race but not making a stereotypic assumption) to high extremity (e.g., biased behavior directed at a specific Black target).
3 Acceptable reliability was found when a second judge coded 15% of the experiences (r = .80, p < .001).
A composite extremity variable was formed for each participant by averaging ratings across experiences, and this composite was predicted with Totd, BIS, IMS, and EMS scores. The only significant effect was a negative relation between IMS scores and extremity, t(135) = 2.13, p < .04, b = -.12. As expected, participants who were less internally motivated to control their prejudice reported more extreme instances of bias. In sum, it seems likely that IMS and Negself were unrelated in our research because lower IMS participants' discrepancy experiences involved more biased responses that apparently were sufficient to elicit feelings of guilt. It seems appropriate to be somewhat cautious about this conclusion, however, because we did not obtain evidence of statistical suppression when extremity was included in the regression model (i.e., the internal motivation-Negself relation did not become significant).
Regulatory impact
A central question in the present research was whether participants' real world discrepancy experiences prompted them to regulate in the future so as to try to control and inhibit prejudiced responses. This was assessed with the regulatory impact rating from the content analysis. Recall that a rating of 1 or 2 on this variable suggested little regulatory impact, whereas 3-5 reflected increasing degrees of future self-regulation based on the initial experience.
Participants whose initial discrepancy experiences had some degree of regulatory impact in the future described how they learned to think and respond more carefully, thereby avoiding the same "mistakes" in the future. For example, There was a guy in our class; he was light skin tone. He was White but he physically appeared Black, you know, stereotypical features-big nose, big lips, whatever they say. I remember once having a thought and it consciously spilling out of my head. It was like a brain fart and I don't know why I'm saying it. I remember saying his name and saying, "he looks like a . . ." and I stopped myself. I felt the n-word rolling off the tip of my tongue. I didn't want to say it. I don't know why I was going to say it. It was kind of scary how it had been programmed into my head by those people around me. Participants often described experiences that had happened to them in the fairly recent past. However, sometimes the experiences shared occurred much earlier in participants' lives. The following participant explains how certain cues still remind her of her discrepancy experience over 10 years after it occurred:
I went to New York to meet my sister. I came from a very small town. We got on a subway and there was a big group of Black guys that I had to stand beside. I was only 10. They had this loud music, they were dressed in clothes that I'm not accustomed to. I was really scared and then after I got off [I realized] they're people, just like me. There was no need to be afraid. They didn't do anything to me. They actually moved over when we got on the subway to give room to stand. After that happened I thought, "Why did I even think that?" because they were normal just like me. I don't know why I was afraid. They didn't do anything. It was just my gut reaction that they were different and it's made out in movies and television that something bad is associated. I was ashamed. They probably looked at me and didn't think anything of me. But I looked at them and automatically thought they were going to do something bad to me because we were in New York. . . . We went in the wintertime so whenever [I] see those big puffy coats, a toboggan [I think of it]. And then if someone's carrying around something playing music. . . . Now when I see people I see the good in them. It's just the way I've changed over time. They would have to show an action for me to think otherwise.
A composite regulatory impact score was formed for each participant by averaging regulatory impact ratings across individual experiences (a = .88).
Descriptive analyses of this variable suggested that participants' initial experiences often did prompt self-regulation in connection with their future prejudice-related responding. The mean regulatory impact rating was 3.29 (SD = 1.02), and 73% of participants' scores were at 3 or above.
4 A particularly important finding was that the correlation between Negself (i.e., whether participants mentioned Negself in relation to each experience or not, averaged across experiences) and regulatory impact scores was significant, r(128) = .20, p < .03. In contrast, regulatory impact was not significantly related to Discomfort scores, r(128) = -.08, ns. When regulatory impact was predicted simultaneously with Negself and Discomfort scores, Negself remained a significant predictor, b = .29, p < .03. Thus, consistent with Devine, Monteith, and colleagues' work (e.g., Devine et al., 1991; Monteith, 1993; Monteith et al., 2002) , the present findings indicate that participants' likelihood of regulating their prejudiced responding was dependent on experiencing negative feelings about themselves in relation to their discrepancies.
Relation to individual difference variables
The only significant effect found in the regression analysis predicting regulatory impact was a main effect for BIS, t(120) = 2.08, p = .04, b = -.19. Unexpectedly, as participants' BIS scores decreased, there was greater evidence of regulatory impact. We forego speculation about this effect until later (see Discussion). As with Negself, we did not find that high IMS participants had greater regulatory impact scores than low IMS participants, as would be expected based on past research with the SRP model (e.g., Monteith, 1993) . Apparently, when participants are free to discuss their own discrepancy experiences (experiences that varied in extremity, see above), these experiences are sufficient for self-regulation even among people without strong internal motivations against prejudice.
Discussion
The results of the present study provide autobiographical accounts of people's awareness of their prejudice-related discrepancies and of subsequent efforts to self-regulate their prejudiced responses, thereby revealing the phenomenology of selfregulation through people's lived experiences. The findings indicated that the vast majority of participants (92%) reported at least one discrepancy experience during the interview, and the content analysis of participants' lived experiences yielded a rich set of descriptive information that highlights common categories of behavioral, thought, and feeling responses that comprised participants' discrepancy experiences. Participants least likely to be able to recount instances of bias that they regretted were those who were unmotivated to control their prejudice for either internal or external reasons. Importantly, many participants (64%) described their experiences as giving rise to negative self-directed affect, and a majority (73%) also described subsequent situations in which their initial discrepancy experience prompted them to attempt to control and change similar prejudiced responses (i.e., based on the regulatory impact ratings of participants' experiences). Furthermore, the regulatory impact of participants' experiences was dependent on the extent of discrepancy-associated Negself they experienced. As posited by the SRP model, Negself is critical, and the relationship found in the present study linking Negself with selfregulation in real world contexts validates a fundamental component of the model. These findings make important contributions to understanding the self-regulation of prejudice. A first contribution concerns the generalizability of past research. The results provide an important complement to laboratory investigations that purposefully reveal participants' biased responses to them and take steps to prevent participants from attributing their responses to anything but prejudice (e.g., Amodio, Master, Yee, & Taylor, 2008; Monteith et al., 2002) . Such procedures beg the question of whether discrepancies are detected in real life settings, when the latitude for ignoring or justifying one's biases arguably is much greater. We have no doubt that people do sometimes fail to recognize their biased responses, particularly ones that follow from automatic processing, and that motivational forces sometimes do lead to rationalization and justification (Allport, 1954 (Allport, /1979 Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; McConahay, 1986) . However, many of our participants clearly were cognizant of instances of bias, found these instances personally troubling, and were prompted toward the future regulation of their biases. Such findings are much more encouraging for self-regulation as a prejudice reduction tool than had we found less evidence of recognized and regretted biases and more indifference in relation to them.
Further support for the generalization of past research to self-regulation that occurs during people's lived experiences stems from relations we found between the number of discrepancy experiences reported and individual difference variables. First, Plant and Devine (1998) argue that people who score low on both the IMS and the EMS should be quite unconcerned about their prejudices. This argument was supported in the context of participants' real world experiences by our finding that these individuals were least likely to report instances of responding with prejudice that they later regretted. We also found a positive relation between scores on the ShouldWould Discrepancy scale and the number of discrepancy experiences reported, suggesting that the hypothetical should-would scenarios from the discrepancy measure bear some relation to people's real world discrepancy experiences.
The results also pointed to relations between individual differences in the Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) and indicators of the self-regulation of prejudice. Individuals with a stronger tendency to monitor situations for potential threats or punishment reported more real world discrepancy experiences. This finding is consistent with theorizing related to the SRP model (e.g., Monteith, 1993) , and with recent laboratory research linking BIS activity with neural systems implicated in the regulation of prejudiced responses (Amodio, Devine, et al., 2008; Amodio, Master, et al., 2008) . However, BIS scores were negatively related to the regulatory impact of participants' prejudiced responses. Perhaps individuals who are more sensitive to threats and punishment become anxious over interracial situations, and this anxiety leads to avoidance rather than regulation. This possibility is consistent with Plant and Butz's (2006) research showing that anxiety over the prospect that one will respond with unwanted intergroup biases leads to avoidance of outgroup situations. It seems further possible given anxiety increases with BIS activation (Gray, 1987) .
A second contribution of our research is related to the theoretical implications it has for understanding the self-regulation of prejudice. These implications arise from instances in which our interview procedure yielded results that diverge from past laboratory findings-findings that have been used as a basis for shaping theory. Prior research has indicated that feeling a personal sense of moral obligation to respond in lowprejudiced ways (i.e., internal motivation) is necessary for the experience of negative self-directed affect in relation to prejudice-related discrepancies, and that people so motivated are most likely to attempt to regulate their prejudices in ways described by the SRP (for relevant reviews, see Monteith et al., in press; Monteith & Mark, 2005 ). However, we found that external motivations were sufficient for reporting discrepancy experiences. Furthermore, participants' degree of internal motivation was unrelated to the experience of negative self-directed affect or to subsequent regulatory impact. These findings suggest that the SRP model can apply to individuals regardless of their degree of internal motivation.
A potential problem is that this conclusion is based on null relations between the IMS and both Negself and regulatory impact scores. However, other aspects of the data suggest that the nonsignificant effects may be meaningful. Negself scores were positively and significantly related to regulatory impact scores, pointing to meaningful patterns of variability in these scores that presumably could have been predicted by IMS scores if there was a relation to be found. Furthermore, IMS scores varied meaningfully, interacting with EMS in a sensible way when predicting number of discrepancy experiences. Thus, we think it unlikely that IMS was unrelated to Negself and regulatory impact because these variables were poorly assessed or lacked meaningful variability. A more likely explanation is that our interview procedure allowed participants to discuss discrepancy experiences from their lived experiences that did, in fact, prompt self-regulation as described in the SRP model. We further suspected that these experiences involved responses that were less subtle than the experiences of higher IMS participants. This speculation was supported by the significant negative relation between the extremity of participants' biased responses and their IMS scores. We should be somewhat cautious about this conclusion, however, because we did not find statistical evidence that extremity acted as a suppressor.
We do think that the consistent findings of nonsignificant relations between internal motivation and both negative self-direct affect and regulatory impact have theoretical implications for the SRP model. Specifically, the model appears to apply more broadly than has previously been assumed (Monteith, 1993; Monteith et al., 2002) . In future research examining the self-regulation of prejudice, we believe that focusing more on the regulation of less subtle prejudiced responses will be important especially for understanding regulation among higher prejudiced individuals. An analysis that takes into account not only who is regulating but also what is being regulated should extend our understanding of the self-regulation of prejudice in important ways. For example, researchers studying prejudice regulation that stems from external (but not internal) motivations to control prejudice argue that regulation is motivated by feelings of threat (e.g., Plant & Devine, 1998) , and that such individuals do not seek to rid themselves of bias but rather to hide their biases from others (Plant & Devine, 2009 ). These arguments are based on regulation in relation to subtle biases, such as in Plant and Devine's (2009) examination of how much effort participants expended to reduce subtle bias as manifested on the Implicit Association Test. If more blatant biases were targeted, conclusions about the instigators and outcomes of regulation may be found to rest on the joint influence of who is regulating and what is being regulated.
We hasten to add that we are not suggesting that the SRP model applies equally to the likelihood of self-regulation among people regardless of their personal motivation to be nonprejudiced. People who are high in internal motivation are likely to regulate for a wider range of responses, subtle as well as non-subtle. A priority for future research is to understand the developmental processes involved in the acquisition of the internal motivation to control prejudice. Motivational theorists argue that external motivation paves the way for the development of internal motivation (Kelman, 1958; Ryan & Connell, 1989) , but prejudice researchers have yet to study this process directly.
Limitations
Although we believe that our phenomenological approach to studying people's lived experiences related to the self-regulation of prejudice makes important contributions, we recognize that the present research is not without limitations. One limitation is our use of a college student sample. We did recruit participants outside the typically used introduction to psychology pool, and participants varied in their majors and year in schooling. However, given a main goal of the research was to address issues of generalization, our results would have been more compelling in this regard had we been able to collect data from a non-college sample. In a related vein, our data were collected in a psychology laboratory setting, which may increase the salience of egalitarian concerns (Henry, 2008) . We doubt that these concerns could have enabled participants to fabricate the experiences they described; however, the setting may have encouraged them to report greater negative self-directed affect than they actually experienced. This issue can be addressed to some degree with reference to the relation between EMS scores and Negself. That is, a demand characteristic explanation would suggest that individuals who are particularly concerned about controlling their prejudice for external reasons should be more inclined to say that their discrepancies created feelings of guilt. This was not the case in the full regression model using all individual difference variables to predict Negself (p > .51), nor was the zero order correlation between EMS and Negself significant, r(141) = -.08, p = .71.
Possible limitations in connection with the way in which we framed instructions for experience recall are also important to consider. We asked participants to recall experiences where they had biased responses "that they later wished they had not had" because these were the experiences we sought to study. However, these instructions could have been framed more broadly (e.g., simply asking participants to describe experiences where they had biased responses). This would have allowed us to address, for example, whether participants indicated that they regretted their biases. Also, we may have found less evidence of negative self-directed affect and regulatory impact if we had not asked about regretted responses, and this may have especially been the case among certain people (e.g., low IMS, high EMS participants).
Another potential limitation of our experience recall procedure is whether participants who reported few discrepancy experiences simply could not recall them because the experiences had not been associated with strong emotional reactions. Memory for events that involve emotions later results in better recall than unemotional events (e.g., Reisberg & Heuer, 2004) . If the emotional experience was critical to recall in our data, we should find that number of experiences reported is related to Negself. That is, participants who report more experiences should be more likely to describe affective reactions in relation to those experiences. Revisiting the data, we did not find evidence for this, r(141) = -.06, p = .48, nor was there a significant correlation with discomfort, r(141) = .03, p = .69. These results help to argue against the idea that discrepancy recollection was driven by participants' discrepancy-associated affect. Although we cannot rule out this possibility for the 12 participants who reported having no discrepancy experiences, it does not seem to be the case in the vast majority of the data set.
Conclusions
In 1991, Feagin published a poignant analysis of middle-class Black Americans' experiences with discrimination that underscored the continuing significance of race in the daily lives of Blacks. Like the present research, Feagin used interview data for his analysis. His work documented participants' common experience of discrimination in public places, the ways in which they attempted to cope with the discrimination, and the costs of having this additional burden in their daily lives. Our findings speak to the continuing significance of race in the treatment of Blacks. We focused on studying responses that participants reported they later wished they had not had, but the fact remains that discriminatory responses were very common. Regardless of whether biases occur outwardly in behavior or in the form of thoughts or feelings, they are likely to affect the nature and course of how Blacks are treated. Furthermore, Blacks face the task of determining whether their treatment is based on race and how to react to perceived biases (e.g., Salvatore & Shelton, 2007) .
The present research indicates that the selfregulation of prejudice is a method that can be implemented in the context of people's lived experiences that can help to reduce discriminatory responses. We believe that learning about the processes involved in the self-regulation of prejudice is important for encouraging people to put it into practice. We hope that one way in which our results will be useful is in providing people with concrete examples of responses that require regulation and tangible instances of how people go about the self-regulation process.
Notes
Participants also completed the 20-item Attitudes
Toward Blacks (ATB; Brigham, 1993) scale so that we could test whether this measure of prejudice was largely redundant with the IMS, which we expected to be the case (see Plant & Devine, 1998) . We found that IMS and ATB scores were highly correlated, r(153) = .72, p < .001. We also examined whether the IMS and ATB functioned similarly in our data set by determining whether the same findings emerged whether one or the other of these indexes was included in analyses. The results were identical in all cases. Furthermore, when analyses focused on the IMS and controlled for ATB scores, the patterns and significance of effects associated with the IMS remained unchanged. Thus, we simplify in the reported results by focusing on the IMS. 2. A photocopying error resulted in four participants missing the page with the "should" items. Thus, these participants had missing values for Totd, which is reflected in the df associated with Totd in the Results section. 3. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this analysis. 4. Scores for the regulatory impact variable were missing, of course, for participants who did not report any experiences in the interview. In addition, data for 12 participants were missing because they did not discuss whether their initial experience affected what they did in the future. Listening to these interviews, it was apparent that the interviewer failed to broach the topic of future impact and left the focus only on participants' initial experiences. These missing data are reflected in the df reported in connection with regulatory impact analyses. 
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